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The murder of Louis, duke of Orléans, in November 1407 was the starting point of a bitter feud 
between the two great rival houses of the kingdom of France, the Armagnacs and the Burgundi-
ans. This was no random killing and had been engineered by John, duke of Burgundy. Once the 
deed was done, this mighty vassal of Charles VI, the mad king of France, had to find someone 
good enough for his defence. Master Jean Petit, a member of the University of Paris, devised and 
delivered the Justification of the Duke of Burgundy, a well-known speech, with all the attributes 
and technical characteristics of a medieval sermon, which barely, even at that time, managed to 
justify the unjustifiable.
Middle Ages; 15th Century; Law and Religion; Kingdom of France; Justification; tyrannicide; 
preaching; civil war; political murder; sermon; Holy Bible; ius; law; usurpation; Valois; Hun-
dred Years War.
To my beloved Gérard
If, at the onset of the XVth century, France had any real pretension to peace 
– at least on the home front – it was doomed to be shattered by the harsh re-
ality of facts. On 23 September 1407, Louis d’Orléans, brother to King Charles 
VI of France, was brutally murdered in a dark Parisian alleyway. This was to 
be the starting point of a merciless struggle that divided fifteenth-century 
France opposing the two great rival houses of the kingdom, the Armagnacs 
and the Burgundians. 
Within the framework of that bitter feud, many so-called agreements 
were reached, many speeches were made, many sermons were preached 
and, more generally speaking, many documents were written. Among them, 
we find what came to be called the Justification of the duke of Burgundy. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the text of the Justification can be 
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deemed a sermon, to determine what sort of sermon, eventually to show how 
this sermon managed to justify the unjustifiable and more precisely, how the 
violation of divine law came to be pardoned. 
The murder of Louis d’Orléans has traditionally been acknowledged to 
have been a terrible deed, as shown in contemporary chronicles and the name 
of his perpetrator, John, duke of Burgundy, nicknamed the Fearless, became 
synonymous with the notions of deceit, treachery, hypocrisy and murder, just 
to name a few. To sum it up, John the Fearless has the reputation of a bad 
man1. He is often called «tyrannicide», since the word designates both «the 
killing of a tyrant» and «the person who kills a tyrant»2. 
Before we actually deal with the text itself, let us try to clarify a number of 
elements since, as it very often happens but particularly here, the text cannot 
be dissociated from the context. We shall see how intricately woven the text is 
with the events it refers to.
1. The historical context
In 1407, King Charles VI of France has been reigning for twenty-seven 
years, fifteen of which blighted by his mental illness, his “disorder” as the con-
temporary chroniclers tactfully refer to it3. As a consequence of his frequent 
inability to rule the kingdom, the enmity between the two dukes, Orléans and 
Burgundy, has evolved and deteriorated to such an extent as to convince the 
latter that he had no other choice but to eliminate his rival if he wanted to 
have his way. Which he did, hiring henchmen to do the deed and we have the 
event profusely related in several chronicles, especially in that by Enguerran 
de Monstrelet. 
This murder was indeed no random killing but a planned assassination. 
Again, we know of the details thanks to the account in Monstrelet’s chronicle, 
which reads: «So many rushed on him that he was struck off his mule, and his 
skull was split that his brains were dashed on the pavement. They turned him 
over and over, and massacred him that he was very soon completely dead»4. 
Those somewhat gory details of the deed are worth mentioning for two rea-
sons: the first one is that they are a contrast to the reactions to the duke’s 
death. His enemies are known to have said: «A blessing on him who struck 
this blow (…) for had Orléans lived the whole kingdom would have been ru-
1 Schnerb, Jean Sans Peur. As for many historical villeins or people who earned much criticism, 
John the Fearless had to wait until 2005 for a historian, Bertrand Schnerb, who undertook to 
explore the unknown aspects of the duke’s personality and the hidden motives of his political 
action.
2 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 794. 
3 «A disorder which deprived him of his reason»: The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet 
(hereafter, Monstrelet).
4 Ibidem, p. 96.
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ined»5. On the one hand, we learn from Monstrelet that the duke was attacked 
by no less than eighteen men so this was a lost battle for him; the initiator of 
the murder had made sure that he would not come out alive. Furthermore, if 
we bear in mind the reputation of Louis d’Orléans as a profligator, who had 
taken from the royal coffers a big share for himself, the whole thing hardly 
comes as a surprise. The second reason is that the murder itself is never men-
tioned in the Justification. 
We only have very subtle allusions to «what has happened to the duke of 
Orléans»; furthermore, the orator uses the adjective «criminal» to qualify the 
victim, not the perpetrator6. Now, we come to the Justification itself, or more 
exactly, the Justifications in the plural. 
The particular speech, which posterity chose to call «the Justification of 
the duke of Burgundy», was delivered on 8 March 1408 by a Master Jean Pet-
it. It was in fact one in several texts of the same sort; it is so to say “the tip of 
the iceberg”. The duke of Burgundy acknowledged his responsibility as early 
as two days after the duke’s death. He did so privately, to his uncles Berri and 
Sicily, who were more than surprised. Then, the following day, he was not al-
lowed to attend the meeting of the Royal Council and he made his decision to 
leave Paris and retreat to his northern territories, for fear of arrest7. Once he 
was in Flanders, he decided to acknowledge the deed in a more public manner. 
He did not wish to express regret or seek forgiveness; he wanted to justify the 
act as necessary for the welfare of the king and the kingdom. The etymology 
of the verb «justify» tells us that it originally means (c. 1300), «to administer 
justice»; (late 14th c.), «to show (something) to be just or right», «act justly 
toward; make just»8. So, there is this pervasive idea of righteousness, of mak-
ing things right and this is exactly what the defensor of John of Burgundy 
undertakes: 
My lord of Burgundy therefore supplicates the king to withdraw from him any hatred 
he may have conceived against him, and he would show him that benignity and grace 
due to his loyal vassal and subject, and to one nearly related to him as he is by blood, 
while I shall explain the causes of justification for my lord of Burgundy9.
Prior to that, the duke had appeared in front of his subjects at Ghent and 
had a ducal councilor read a justification aloud. Unfortunately, the text has 
not been preserved but we know that it was largely broadcast10. The next step 
is often called the Conferences of Amiens; they took place in January 1408. 
They were attended by the royal princes, Berri and Sicily and royal councilors. 
5 Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 37.
6 Monstrelet, p. 148.
7 Coville, Jean Petit, p. 91.
8 «Justify», in Online Etymology Dictionary <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=justi-
fy> (consulted on 15/03/2018).
9 Monstrelet, p. 110.
10 Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 37.
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They all advised John of Burgundy to petition the king for pardon and mercy 
for, after all, a crime had been committed. But the obstinate duke declined to 
do so. Instead, he demanded that the crime should be ascribed to him as mer-
it11. A second justification which has likewise disappeared, was written and 
at that point, the duke had made sure to be represented by a team of skilled 
advocates, among whom we find Master John Petit. 
The two main royal princes were flabbergasted by the duke’s arrogance 
but they wanted to avoid conflict at any rate; they did not want civil war. They 
tried to explain to the duke that it was not such a good idea to go to the capital 
and justify in front of the sovereign the murder of his brother. John the Fear-
less was true to his nickname and, eventually, the princes vaguely assented to 
his return to Paris. 
In late February, John of Burgundy was in Paris with his soldiers; the 
greeting from the Parisians was most warm-hearted. But this was not the 
duke’s objective; what he wanted was the official justification of his deed so 
that, afterwards, he could take over, unhindered, the governance of the realm. 
Parallel to that, we also know of a kind of third justification, an unofficial 
one, unpublished as well, a sort of manifesto, a proclamation of the Duke of 
Burgundy’s glorious action when he had the duke of Orléans killed. The pam-
phlet contains such assertions as «We are mindful that the Greeks decreed 
divine honours to tyrannicides, that tyrannicides, as we read in the chroni-
cles, have filled the whole world with their glory»12. But no matter how many 
bombastic scholarly authorities were inserted in the text, it was not to satisfy 
the duke who, according to his will, appeared in front of the King, on 8 March 
1408, and was represented by Master John Petit.
Except that he did not appear in front of the king because Charles VI was 
unwell. Actually, it is a shame that the meeting was not scheduled for the day 
after because on 9 March, the king was better and he received his nephew; 
he even granted him a full and complete pardon13. Anyway, on the eighth, 
Charles VI was represented by his son, the duke of Guyenne, a nine-year-old 
child and we can truly sympathize with the boy who had to remain seated and 
put for four long hours, which was the duration of the speech. 
2. The «Justification», a proper sermon?
One important question concerning that speech is: is the Justification 
being worthy of being called a sermon. The appellation may indeed seem 
a bit far-fetched in the sense that the text is nowhere to be found called a 
«sermon». In the contemporary chronicles, it is either designated by the term 
11 Ibidem.
12 Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 39.
13 Ibidem, p. 47.
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«justification» or, more plainly, «speech». But, on the one hand, we know that 
a sermon is a multi-faceted genre and can appear under different names and 
on the other hand, preaching was one of the most powerful, if not the mighti-
est, means of spreading a message, and not only a Christian one14. 
If we start with the primary meaning of the word «sermon» in the sense 
of «discourse», speech, talk, “originally” a «stringing together of words»15, 
it is indeed a very long «stringing together of words» since the text is ap-
proximately 16,000 words long. The text that has reached us is in macaronic 
form, that is interspersed with Latin quotations, some of them very long, up to 
ninety-two words in one go for the longest. There is however little doubt that 
the oral delivery was very close to the version we have, since we know from 
contemporary chronicles that Jean Petit spoke for as long as four hours. 
So the text definitely meets the requirements of a sermon in the sense 
that it is an oral discourse, spoken in the voice of a preacher who addresses an 
audience. The purpose of the Justification was, like a sermon, to instruct and 
exhort the audience: it is a communicative discourse with a view to persuad-
ing the audience of the worthiness of a certain message contained. 
Last but not least, the sermon is supposed to deal with a topic concerned 
with faith and morals and usually based on a sacred text. Here again, the 
Justification meets the requirements of a proper sermon: Jean Petit took as 
his theme the words of St Paul, the Apostle, in 1Tim 6,10, «radix omnium 
malorum est cupiditas» (Covetousness is the root to all evils) and very skill-
fully emphasized the nefarious importance of the sin of covetousness. Petit 
said that cupiditas was in fierce competition with superbia for precedence. 
Which is exactly the reason why he chose Eccli 10,15: «initium omnis peccati 
est superbia» as his exordium, according to the rules of medieval preaching.
If we go back to a basic definition of preaching, it is public, open instruc-
tion in faith and morals or good conduct. The Justification was certainly a 
public event, even a momentous day during which there was, prior to the 
speech, a solemn procession led by Duke John of Burgundy from his Hôtel 
d’Artois, which was his Parisian residence, to the Hôtel St Pol where the meet-
ing was to take place16. And we know that it was attended by many people. The 
aim was to instruct people, to tell them how they should understand, interpret 
the death of Louis d’Orléans. As a sermon is supposed to edify the audience, 
the Justification seeks to direct people’s way of regarding Burgundy’s respon-
sibility in the murder of his cousin. 
If we adopt the principle that the Justification is indeed a sermon, then, 
the next question is: what sort of sermon? We know that, traditionally, ser-
mons were not supposed to deal with current events since their primary pur-
14 Coletti, L’éloquence de la chaire, p. 56.
15 «serm-, sermo-», in English-Word Information < http://wordinfo.info/unit/1944 > (consul-
ted on 15/03/2018).
16 Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 39.
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pose was the teaching of the Sacred Word17. But we also know that there was 
a particular category of sermons, called sermones de occasionibus, circum-
stancial sermons, that were preached on particular occasions so as to meet 
the requirements of the day. This is definitely the case of the Justification.
3. The orator
Let us turn to the man who spoke on behalf of John the Fearless. The 
question that comes to one’s mind is: why him? John Petit was a theologian 
and a professor at the University of Paris. He did not belong to any particular 
religious order and obviously owed his education to the generosity of the Duke 
of Burgundy who granted him a pension as he very explicitly says in the intro-
duction to his Justification. 
The reason for the Justification by John Petit is clearly enunciated: he was 
in the paid service of the duke and as such, could not refuse the task he had 
been given: «I am bound by my oath, given to him three years ago, to serve 
him»18. As to why he had been chosen among other clerks, by John the Fear-
less, that was presumably because he had been made a doctor of theology a 
few years before. We also know that he was an active member of the faculty of 
theology, known to have played a role in the attempts to find a solution to the 
Great Schism. A short time before the Justification, he had been a member of 
an embassy sent by the king of France to urge the two rival popes to abdicate 
for the sake of Western Christendom. It is true that the embassy had been 
fruitless but it had certainly earned a reputation of some sort to John Petit19. 
Thus, John of Burgundy picked this particular individual because he met his 
requirements: he belonged to his retinue and he could not be refuted by any-
one as not fitting the frame: he was an acknowledged theologian even though 
he endeavours to assert the contrary: «were I a theologian»20; «I am no theo-
logian», as though he wanted to demonstrate that the duke of Burgundy had 
picked the wrong man. 
In spite of a few established drawbacks such as the pedantic character-
istics of his orations, John Parvus had begun to acquire some fame in the 
University circles of Paris. However, the Justification was going to give him 
definite notoriety. It was known later (1413) that his colleagues had actively 
tried to deter him from speaking on behalf of the duke of Burgundy, the col-
lege to which he belonged (the college of the Treasurer) having no particular 
connection or antagonism with the duke of Burgundy. They simply did not 
wish to see one of them involved in a most doubtful business. The least that 
17 Spencer, Middle English Sermons, p. 634.
18 Monstrelet, p. 110.
19 All the information concerning Jean Petit come from: Dégert, John Parvus <http://www.
newadvent.org/cathen/08482b.htm>. 
20 Monstrelet, p. 113.
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can be said is that, obviously, John Petit was not comfortable in his role of 
justifier of the murder of Louis of Orléans since, both at the beginning and at 
the end of his address, he takes many precautions so as to avoid antagonism: 
«should I utter anything improper»; «I therefore very humbly entreat you»; 
«I now protest that I intend no injury whatever to any person»21; in fact, to 
put it plainly, John Petit, the justifier of the duke of Burgundy, makes his own 
justification in the introduction.
Of course, this is only a fragmentary interpretation of the title. The es-
sential part of the Justification is not about John Petit but about the duke 
of Burgundy, what he did to the duke of Orleans and the fact that he should 
not be condemned for it. To the former’s credit, the reactions to his demise 
were ambiguous and far from unanimous; the royal princes, for example, did 
not present a united front: some wanted to react, others wanted to compro-
mise with John of Burgundy. The truth is that they were afraid of taking steps 
against him. John was popular in Paris, particularly with the people; they 
expected him to make reforms in the administration and there was no regret 
for the murdered duke who had heavily taxed the Parisians to line his purse. 
Also, in university circles, he was not mourned for he had supported the Avi-
gnonese pope and this had angered university circles22.
4. The tyrannicide
Now, let’s have a look at the Justification from a different angle: if the 
murder of the duke of Orléans was a tyrannicide, which category did it belong 
to? We know that there are 3 different opinions on the ethical questions: 
a) Those who hold that the sixth commandment («non occides»: Ex 20,13) 
is to be interpreted as forbidding killing in any form, naturally believe 
tyrannicide to be included in the prohibition.
b) Those who (on the basis of Rom 13,123) hold that force is by Divine autho-
rity invested in the de facto civil government also believe tyrannicide to 
be morally unjustifiable.
c) Those who hold that rebellion, including tyrannicide, is defensible and 
right in circumstances where, if the oppressor were an alien, war would 
be justified, and provided that the grievance is considerable, that the cir-
cumstances offer no milder means of redress, and that the killing is not 
simply an act of revenge24.
It goes without saying that John Petit was the sort of theologian who went 
for the third kind of opinion. He was going to demonstrate that the killing had 
21 Monstrelet, p. 112.
22 Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy, p. 87.
23 «Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from 
God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God» (King James Version).
24 The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, p. 1649.
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not been a simple act of revenge and that the grievance had been so consider-
able as to endanger the welfare of the king and his kingdom. John Petit main-
tains that the duke had no other solution than to rid the kingdom of Louis 
d’Orléans’s tyranny. But then, if Louis had been a tyrant, what sort of tyrant?
There are two classes of tyrants whose circumstances are widely apart: 
tyrants by usurpation and tyrants by oppression. A tyrant by usurpation 
(tyrannus in titulo) is one who unjustly displaces or attempts to displace the 
legitimate supreme ruler. A tyrant by oppression (tyrannus in regimine) is a 
supreme ruler who uses his power arbitrarily and oppressively. 
The question is of course: was Louis d’Orléans a proper tyrant? It is true 
that the king’s young brother was not exactly popular, particularly with the 
Parisians, whom he harassed with taxes; just before his death for example, a 
new tax had been levied, apparently on the instigation of the duke of Orléans 
and the opposition of the new duke of Burgundy, John the Fearless. Thus, 
«(…) the duke of Burgundy received the favour of the people, while Louis of 
Orléans received their scorn and hatred»25. 
To the question: «can Louis d’Orléans, be deemed a tyrant?», the answer 
is yes and no. On the one hand, he certainly tended to act like a tyrant; for 
example, he walked out of the Crusade to Hungary; he was in favour of the re-
newal of the war against England. He had worked hard to enlarge his territorial 
possessions and to strengthen his influence on the king’s government26. He had 
done his best to evict his uncle of Burgundy from the royal council. He didn’t 
approve of the government’s attitude towards the Avignonese pope, Benedict 
XIII. He wanted to support him for his own interests. He placed his supporters 
at every level of the French administration so as to have people, everywhere, at 
his beck and call27. He used to levy heavy taxes to finance his offensive policies 
(particularly against England and also to fight his uncle). Last but not least, he 
had notoriously acquired much land and thus extended his power thanks to his 
brother’s generosity and weakness. In one word, he had lined his purse. 
On the other hand, and as far as elements in his favour were concerned, 
he had a more legitimate claim to the throne (or to power, at least) than John 
the Fearless. He was the king’s next-of-kin. In case of the king’s death and 
because the heir to the throne was underage, it would have been normal and 
accepted that he should become regent. Such lawyers as Bartolus de Saxofer-
rato and Jean de Terre Vermeille have argued that a legitimate prince (which, 
again, Louis d’Orléans was) cannot become a tyrant. They take into account 
that tyranny is the violent usurpation of power by a man who separates him-
self from law and the life of the mystical body of the king. In that sense, ty-
rannicide cannot really exist and, in any case, places itself at the limit of the 
political and the religious28. 
25 Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue, p. 39.
26 Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, p. 60.
27 Ibidem, p. 62.
28 Vauchez, Dictionnaire encyclopédique du Moyen-Âge, p. 1545.
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Going back to 8 March 1408, John Petit delivered a pedantic address, bris-
tling with propositions, syllogisms, Scriptural texts, and examples from Holy 
Writ. His argument may be expressed in the following syllogism: Whosoever 
is guilty of high treason and becomes a tyrant, deserves to be punished with 
death, all the more so when he is a near relative of the king; and in that case 
the natural, moral, and Divine laws allow any subject whatever, without any 
command or public authorization, to kill him or to have him killed openly, or 
by stealth; and the more closely the author of the slaying is related to the king 
the more meritorious the act. Now, the Duke of Orléans — so ran the minor 
proposition – a slave to the passion of greed, the source of all evil, was guilty 
of high treason, and was a tyrant; which was proved by holding him guilty of 
all the pretended crimes which popular imagination and the partisans of the 
Duke of Burgundy laid to his charge. The conclusion was therefore that the 
Duke of Burgundy not only should not be punished or blamed for what had 
been done to the Duke of Orléans, but rather should be rewarded. This thesis 
seemed preposterous to the more rational members of the assembly; but the 
Duke of Burgundy was present with his troops, ready to suppress any attempt 
at reply and, additionally, he was in the good graces of the university; so he 
had no difficulty in winning his case, if we use modern terminology. 
Now, how did the Justification manage to justify the unjustifiable? Or did it?
No matter how often and fervently the duke repeated that he had accom-
plished a meritorious act by killing his rival of Orléans, the bottom line was 
that blood had been shed, in a most horrific manner and that went against 
the sixth commandment contained in Ex 20,13, «non occides», thou shalt not 
kill. How did John Petit go about demonstrating that this was not to be con-
demned? It was violation of the divine law in the first degree.
Obviously, he did not bother with the subtle distinction between tyran-
nicide and political murder. Oscar Jaszi, in his article written in 1944, enti-
tled The Stream of Political Murder, distinguishes between no less than six 
different types of political murder. It appears that which the duke d’Orléans 
was a victim of was a mixture of two of them: first, «assassination committed 
for personal motives» since the deed was done against a prominent person 
connected with the State and was motivated by hatred, revenge and jealousy. 
Secondly, it was also «assassination for power» with the aim to eliminate 
«dangerous or hated political opponents»29. 
It is widely acknowledged by all the authors who have been working on 
the Justification of the duke of Burgundy, that the text, the event, the orator, 
the circumstances, everything remotely connected with the event, are notori-
ous. All the more so as the Justification gave rise to numerous consequences, 
its refutation and condemnation by Jean Gerson among them. In 1415, the 
Council of Constance was to regulate the concept of tyrannicide and expressly 
condemn some of Jean Petit’s propositions such as: 
29 Jaszi, The Stream of Political Murder, p. 359.
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Any vassal or subject can lawfully and meritoriously kill, and ought to kill, any tyrant. 
He may even, for this purpose, avail himself of ambushes, and wily expressions of 
affection or of adulation, notwithstanding any oath or pact imposed upon him by the 
tyrant, and without waiting for the sentence or order of any judge30.
5. Conclusion
It is often said that sermons are in a sense representative of the contem-
porary societies in which they were preached. This is particularly true of the 
Justification. The speech was delivered at a key-moment of the political life in 
fifteenth-century France. It is certainly representative of the chaotic situation 
that prevailed at the time in the kingdom due to rivalries and the inability of 
Charles VI to rule his kingdom. It is representative of the capacity of orators 
to twist the legal frameworks in which they evolved, as did Jean Petit, but up 
to a point because, as a matter of fact, the Justification is also representative 
of the versatility of both politics and men. In 1407, the duke of Orléans is 
murdered and barely a year later, the Justification is delivered. The point is 
apparently made by the orator. The following day, the duke of Burgundy is 
officially pardoned by the king. 
As for Jean Petit who, in his address was not ashamed to admit that he 
was receiving, and expected still to receive, a pension from the Duke of Bur-
gundy, he found it more prudent to withdraw from Paris and retire to the 
estate of the Duke of Burgundy in Artois, where he died shortly afterwards in 
a house of his protector, regretting, it is said, that he had ever allowed himself 
to defend such a proposition.
Historical hindsight allows us to add that as long as the Duke of Burgundy 
was all-powerful in Paris, the argument could not be attacked publicly, but 
when things turned sour for him and he was expelled, another scholar, Jean 
Gerson, in a sermon delivered before the king, strongly denounced several of 
Jean Petit’s propositions as heretical and scandalous. That was in 1413. There 
followed a lengthy dispute involving the bishop of Paris as well as sixty doc-
tors into what was called the «Council of the Faith» which ended in the formal 
condemnation of Jean Petit’s Justification.
The council had no intention of lending its authority to any political party, 
and in its fifteenth session, 6 July, 1415, contented itself with a general con-
demnation of tyrannicide as upheld in the following proposition:
A tyrant may be licitly and meritoriously, and rightly put to death by any vassal or 
subject, even by resorting to secret plots, adulation, and feigned friendship, notwith-
standing any oath of fealty to him or treaty concluded with him, without any judicial 
decree or order.
30 Monstrelet, p. 137.
211
Catherine Royer-Hemet, The «Justification» of Johannes Parvus
But Johannes Parvus was not mentioned and the council avoided saying 
that any such proposition was contained in his address, and no further deci-
sion was pronounced by the council on the particular case of John Petit.
As for the versatility of men, after securing the condemnation of John 
Petit in August, 1416, King Charles VI two years later disavowed Gerson and 
his supporters in October, 1418, and in November, 1418, he rehabilitated Petit 
and annulled the sentences pronounced against him. By then, John Petit had 
been dead several years and a year later, John the Fearless, who had obviously 
and ostentatiously defied divine law, met his death on the Pont de Montereau 
in November 1419, by being, in his turn, brutally murdered. Historians are 
still discussing the responsibility of the Dauphin, the future Charles VII, in 
this other very violent deed of fifteenth-century France, as to whether this 
was another tyrannicide.
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